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Abstract
Detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs is critical for safely deploying deep
learning models in an open-world setting. However, existing OOD detection solu-
tions can be brittle under small adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we propose a
simple and effective method, Adversarial Training with informative Outlier Mining
(ATOM), to robustify OOD detection. Our key observation is that while unlabeled
data can be used as auxiliary OOD training data, the majority of these data points
are not informative to improve the decision boundary of the OOD detector. We
show that, by carefully choosing which outliers to train on, one can significantly
improve the robustness of the OOD detector, and somewhat surprisingly, generalize
to some adversarial attacks not seen during training. We provide additionally a
unified evaluation framework that allows future research examining the robustness
of OOD detection algorithms. ATOM achieves state-of-the-art performance under
a broad family of natural and perturbed OOD evaluation tasks, surpassing previous
methods by a large margin. Finally, we provide theoretical insights for the benefit
of auxiliary unlabeled data and outlier mining.
1 Introduction
Out-of-distribution (OOD) uncertainty estimation has become an indispensable part of building
reliable open-world machine learning models [1]. An OOD detector determines whether an input is
from the same distribution as the training data (in-distribution), or a different distribution (out-of-
distribution). The performance of the OOD detector is central for safety-critical applications such as
autonomous driving [13] or rare disease identification [6].
Despite exciting progress made in OOD detection, previous methods mostly focused on natural OOD
data [19, 29, 28, 26, 20, 33]. Scant attention has been paid to the robustness aspect of OOD detection.
Recently, Sehwag et al. [42] demonstrated that OOD detection methods can be evaded by worst-case
adversarial perturbations [37, 16, 5, 47]. For example, an OOD image (e.g., mailbox) can be perturbed
to be misclassified by the OOD detector as in-distribution (traffic sign data). Such an adversarial
OOD example1 is then passed to the image classifier and trigger undesirable prediction and action
(e.g., speed limit 70). Therefore, the failure mode leads to the following important question: how
can we make out-of-distribution detection algorithm robust in the presence of small perturbations to
OOD inputs?
Motivated by this, we propose a method called Adversarial Training with informative Outlier Mining
(ATOM), which achieves state-of-the-art performance on a broad family of natural and perturbed
OOD inputs. Our key observation is that while unlabeled data [20] provides the abundance of OOD
data to train on, the majority OOD examples can be too easy to provide useful information and
meaningfully improve the decision boundary of OOD detector. We show that, by carefully choosing
1We note here that the adversarial OOD examples are constructed w.r.t the OOD detectors G(x), rather than
the image classification model f(x).
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Figure 1: When deploying an image classification system (OOD detector G(x) + image classifier f(x)) in
an open world, there can be multiple types of out-of-distribution examples. We consider a broad family of
OOD inputs, including (a) natural OOD, (b) adversarially perturbed OOD under L∞ norm perturbation, and
(c) corruption attacked OOD. In (b-d), a perturbed OOD input (e.g., a perturbed mailbox image) can mislead
the OOD detector to classify it as an in-distribution sample. This can trigger the downstream image classifier
f(x) to predict it as one of the in-distribution classes (e.g., speed limit 70). Through adversarial training with
informative outlier mining (ATOM), our method can robustify the decision boundary of OOD detector G(x),
which leads to improved performance across all types of OOD inputs. Solid lines are actual computation flow.
which OOD data to train on, one can significantly improve the robustness of an OOD detector, and
somewhat surprisingly, generalize to unseen adversarial attacks.
Contributions. We provide a unified framework that allows examining the robustness of OOD
detection algorithms under a broad family of OOD inputs, as illustrated in Figure 1. Our evaluation
goes beyond previous approaches that primarily focus on natural OOD inputs. Under this taxonomy,
we extensively examine the robustness of eight common OOD detection methods listed in Table 1.
Our experiments reveal that existing methods have heterogeneous performance across various types of
perturbations. In particular, we show that methods relying on pre-trained neural networks [19, 29, 28]
are fragile across all types of perturbations. While [17] provides robustness against adversarial OOD
examples generated by L∞-norm bounded attacks, we observe that such defense can be somewhat
brittle when we switch to attacks not seen during training.
To this end, we devise a simple and effective method, ATOM, which improves the OOD detection
performance on both clean data and perturbed inputs. The key idea of our method is to adaptively
choose informative OOD training examples that the OOD detector is mildly uncertain about. When
evaluating on natural OOD data, our method outperforms state-of-the-art method [33] on all datasets.
On CIFAR-10, our method outperforms the best baseline [17] by 60.55% (FPR) under L∞-norm
attacked OOD inputs. Our method can also generalize surprisingly well to unknown corrupted OOD
inputs, outperforming the best baseline by 29.55% measured by FPR. Finally, while almost every
method fails under the strongest compositional attack, our method reduces the FPR by 61.78%. Our
training method leads to improved OOD detection while maintaining similar classification accuracy
on in-distribution data as a pre-trained model. We conduct ablation analysis to explore the effect of
informative outlier sampling.
Lastly, we provide theoretical analysis formalizing the intuition behind our method. Under a Gaussian
model of the data, we show that the auxiliary data can significantly reduce the in-distribution sample
size needed. We also show that using outlier mining helps learn a correct detector in the presence of
non-informative examples. These theoretical results justify using auxiliary unlabeled data and outlier
mining for robust OOD detection.
Our code is available at: https://github.com/jfc43/informative-outlier-mining.
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MSP ODIN Mahalanobis SOFL OE ACET CCU ROWL ATOM
[19] [29] [28] [33] [20] [17] [32] [42] (ours)
Natural OOD 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
L∞ OOD 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3
Corruption OOD 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3
Comp. OOD 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3
Table 1: Common OOD detection methods and a family of natural and perturbed OOD examples we considered.
We provide descriptions of each method in Appendix B.3.
2 Problem Statement
In this section, we describe the problem of robust out-of-distribution detection, as well as a unified
evaluation framework for this problem.
Preliminaries. We consider a training dataset Dtrainin drawn i.i.d. from a data distribution PX,Y ,
where X is the sample space and Y = {1, 2, · · · ,K} is the set of labels. An image classifier f(x)
is trained on the in-distribution, PX , the marginal distribution of PX,Y . The OOD examples are
revealed during test time, which are from a different distribution QX , potentially with perturbations
added. The task of robust out-of-distribution detection is to learn a detector G : x→ {−1, 1}, which
outputs 1 for x from PX and output −1 for a clean or perturbed OOD example x from QX .
Formally, let Ω(x) be a set of small perturbations on an OOD example x. The detector is evaluated
on x from PX and on the worst-case input inside Ω(x) for an OOD example from QX. The false
negative rate (FNR) and false positive rate (FPR) are defined as:
FNR(G) = Ex∼PXI[G(x) = −1], FPR(G;QX,Ω) = Ex∼QX max
δ∈Ω(x)
I[G(x+ δ) = 1]. (1)
Robust OOD Evaluation Tasks. We consider the following family of OOD inputs:
• Natural OOD: This is equivalent to the classic OOD evaluation where clean input x is
used [19, 29, 28, 33, 20, 26] and Ω = Ø.
• L∞ attacked OOD (white-box): We consider small L∞-norm bounded perturbations on
x [30, 2], which induce the model to produce high confidence scores (or low OOD scores)
for OOD inputs. The set of adversarial perturbations is Ω∞,(x), where  is the adversarial
budget. We provide attack algorithms for all eight OOD detection methods in Appendix B.4.
• Corruption attacked OOD (black-box): We consider a more realistic type of attack based
on common corruptions [18], which could appear naturally in the physical world. Some
corruptions include noise, blur, and weather, etc. We provide details in Appendix B.4.
• Compositionally attacked OOD (white-box): Lastly, we consider applying L∞-norm
bounded attack and corruption attack jointly to an input x, as considered in [25].
We show visualizations for four types of OOD samples in Appendix B.5. In Table 1, we list common
OOD detection methods and corresponding OOD inputs considered. To our knowledge, we are the
first to examine the performance of OOD methods under all four types of perturbations.
3 ATOM: Adversarial Training with Informative Outlier Mining
In this section, we introduce our method, Adversarial Training with informative Outlier Mining
(ATOM), for robust OOD detection. In what follows, we first describe the adversarial training
objective and then introduce how we use informative outlier mining to improve the learning.
Training Objective. We consider a (K + 1)-way classifier network fˆ , where the (K + 1)-th class
label indicates out-of-distribution class. Denote by Fˆθ(x) the softmax output of fˆ on x. The robust
training objective is given by
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrainin [`(x, y; Fˆθ)] + λ · Ex∼Dtrainout maxx′∈Ω∞,(x)[`(x
′,K + 1; Fˆθ)], (2)
where ` is the cross entropy loss, and Dtrainout is the OOD training dataset. We use Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [30] to solve the inner max of the objective, and apply it to half of a minibatch while
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Figure 2: On CIFAR-10, we train a DenseNet with objective (2) for 100 epochs without informative outlier
mining. At epoch 30, we randomly sample 400,000 data points fromDauxiliaryout , and plot the OOD score frequency
distribution (a). We observe that the model quickly converges to solution where OOD score distribution becomes
dominated by easy examples with score closer to 1, as shown in (b). Therefore, training on these easy OOD data
points can no longer help improve the decision boundary of OOD detector. We also observe that training on too
hard examples with score closer to 0 might be harmful since those examples resemble in-distribution data (c).
keeping the other half clean to ensure proper performance on both clean and perturbed data. Once
trained , the OOD detector G(x) can be constructed by:
G(x) =
{
−1 if Fˆ (x)K+1 ≥ γ,
1 if Fˆ (x)K+1 < γ,
(3)
where γ is the threshold, and in practice can be chosen on the in-distribution data so that a high
fraction of test examples are correctly classified by G. We call Fˆ (x)K+1 the OOD score of x. For an
input that is labeled as in-distribution by G, one can obtain its semantic label using F (x):
F (x) = arg max
y∈{1,2,··· ,K}
Fˆ (x)y (4)
Informative Outlier Mining. When training a neural network, we may not have data from the test
out-of-distribution QX, but instead, have an unlabeled auxiliary dataset Dauxiliaryout from distribution
UX. While unlabeled data gives rise to the abundance of OOD data to train, we observe that the above
training objective quickly converges to the solution where OOD training data yield high OOD scores
(see Figure 2). Continuing the training process on these OOD data points can no longer provide
meaningful information that improves the decision boundary of the OOD detector.
Motivated by this, we propose to adaptively choose OOD training examples where the detector is
mildly uncertain about. We provide the complete training algorithm using informative outlier mining
in Algorithm 1. Our method is different from random sampling as used in previous works [20, 17, 32,
33]. Specifically, during each training epoch, we randomly sample N data points from the unlabeled
OOD dataset Dauxiliaryout , and use the current model to infer the OOD scores2. After that, we sort the
data points according to the OOD scores and select a subset of n < N data points, starting with the
qN th data in the sorted list. We then use the selected samples as OOD training data Dtrainout for the next
epoch of training. Intuitively, q determines the informativeness of the sampled points w.r.t the OOD
detector. The larger q is, the less informative those sampled examples become. We report ablation
analysis in more detail in Section 4.3.
Note that informative outlier mining is performed on (non-adversarial) unlabeled data. Selected
examples are then used in the robust training objective (2). Both our empirical and theoretical studies
reveal the importance of outlier mining for the robust OOD detection task.
4 Experiments
In this section, we describe our experimental setup (Section 4.1) and show that ATOM can substan-
tially improve OOD detection performance on both clean data and adversarially perturbed inputs. We
conducted extensive ablation analysis to explore the effect of informative outlier mining (Section 4.3).
2Since the inference stage can be fully parallel, outlier mining can be applied with relatively low overhead.
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Algorithm 1 ATOM: Adversarial Training with informative Outlier Mining.
input Dtrainin , Dauxiliaryout , Fˆθ, m, N , n, q
output F , G
for t = 1, 2, · · · ,m do
Randomly sample N data points from Dauxiliaryout to get a candidate set S.
Compute OOD scores on S using current model Fˆθ to get set V = {Fˆ (x)K+1 | x ∈ S}.
Sort scores in V from the lowest to the highest.
Dtrainout ← V [qN : qN + n] . {q ∈ [0, 1− n/N ]}
Train Fˆθ for one epoch using the training objective of (2).
end for
Build G and F using objective (3) and (4) respectively.
4.1 Setup
In-distribution Datasets. we use CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets [24] as in-distribution datasets.
Out-of-distribution Datasets. For auxiliary outlier dataset Dauxiliaryout , we use 80 Million Tiny Images
[49]. We follow the same deduplication procedure as in [20] and remove all examples in this dataset
that appear in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For OOD test dataset, we follow the procedure in [29, 20]
and use six different natural image datasets: SVHN [35], Textures [10], Places365 [53], LSUN
(crop) [52], LSUN (resize) [52], and iSUN [51].
Hyperparameters. The hyperparameter q is chosen on a separate validation set from Tiny Im-
ages [49], which does not depend on test-time OOD data (see Appendix B.8). Based on the validation
results in Table 6, we set q = 0.125 for CIFAR-10 and q = 0.25 for CIFAR-100. To ensure fair
comparison, in each epoch, ATOM uses the same amount of outlier data as OE, where n is twice larger
than the in-distribution data size (i.e., 50,000). We set λ = 1, N = 400, 000, and n = 100, 000.
Evaluation Metrics. We measure the following metrics: the false positive rate (FPR) at 5% false
negative rate (FNR) and the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC).
More details about experimental set up are in Appendix B.1.
4.2 Results
How do existing OOD detection methods perform under robust evaluation tasks? Our experi-
ments reveal that existing methods have heterogeneous performance across various types of OOD
inputs. Table 2 presents detailed evaluation and comparison with eight competitive OOD detection
techniques from the literature. All the numbers reported are averaged over six different OOD test
datasets described in Sec. 4.1. First of all, we observe that approaches using pretrained models such
as MSP [19], ODIN [29], and Mahalanobis [28] are fragile across all types of adversarially perturbed
OOD inputs. Secondly, although recent methods OE [20], SOFL [33] and CCU [32] work well under
natural OOD data and are mildly robust under corruption attacked OOD inputs, they fail under other
attacks such as L∞-norm bounded attacks and compositional attacks. Lastly, while [17, 42] provides
robustness against adversarial OOD examples generated by L∞-norm bounded attacks by explicitly
training on this attack, we observe that such defense becomes brittle when we switch to unknown
adversaries, such as corruption and compositional attacks.
How does ATOM compare to existing solutions? We show in Table 2 that ATOM outperforms
existing methods on both natural and perturbed OOD evaluation tasks. First, when evaluating on
natural OOD data, ATOM outperforms current state-of-the-art method SOFL [33]. On CIFAR-10,
our method outperforms the best baseline ACET [17] by 60.55% (FPR) under the L∞ attacked
OOD task. While ACET is somewhat brittle under unknown attacks, our method can generalize
surprisingly well to unknown corruption attacked OOD inputs, outperforming the best baseline by
29.55% measured by FPR. Finally, while almost every method fails under the strongest compositional
attack, our method reduces the FPR by 61.78%. The performance is noteworthy since our method is
not trained explicitly on corrupted OOD inputs.
How does ATOM affect the in-distribution classification accuracy? ATOM improves the OOD
detection performance while achieving in-distribution classification accuracy that is on par with a
pre-trained network. In Table 5 (Appendix B.7), we show the comparison across all methods. On
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Dtestin Method
FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC
(5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR)
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Natural OOD Corruption OOD L∞ OOD Comp. OOD
CIFAR-
10
MSP 50.54 91.79 100.00 58.34 100.00 13.83 100.00 13.67
ODIN 21.72 94.72 99.30 52.32 99.99 0.17 100.00 0.01
Mahalanobis 28.50 89.60 94.58 37.76 97.67 3.90 99.93 0.32
SOFL 2.78 99.04 61.82 88.72 99.98 1.08 100.00 0.77
OE 3.66 98.82 56.44 90.66 99.95 0.35 99.99 0.16
ACET 13.13 97.61 68.54 88.00 75.86 77.66 97.86 52.99
CCU 3.39 98.92 56.50 89.34 99.90 0.36 99.98 0.21
ROWL 43.14 77.78 94.19 52.26 93.40 52.65 97.86 50.42
ATOM (ours) 2.07 99.11 26.95 94.96 15.31 97.33 36.08 93.78
CIFAR-
100
MSP 78.05 76.11 100.00 30.08 100.00 2.35 100.00 2.13
ODIN 53.03 84.45 100.00 36.36 100.00 0.40 100.00 0.01
Mahalanobis 43.25 85.65 96.62 33.47 95.13 26.71 99.91 10.32
SOFL 43.36 91.21 99.92 45.20 100.00 0.42 100.00 0.30
OE 49.21 88.05 99.96 45.10 100.00 0.97 100.00 0.59
ACET 47.69 88.47 99.86 43.38 79.33 50.59 98.60 24.96
CCU 43.04 90.95 99.90 48.32 100.00 0.78 100.00 0.47
ROWL 95.82 51.90 100.00 49.80 99.99 49.81 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 34.06 93.79 99.08 72.27 52.89 82.61 96.83 68.93
Table 2: Comparison with competitive OOD detection methods. We evaluate on four types of OOD inputs:
(1) natural OOD, (2) corruption attacked OOD, (3) L∞ attacked OOD, and (4) compositionally attacked OOD
inputs. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is better. All values are percentages and are
averaged over six OOD test datasets described in section 4.1. Bold numbers are superior results.
CIFAR-10, ATOM achieves a test error of 5.02%, compared to a pre-trained model 5.61%. On
CIFAR-100, ATOM achieves a test error of 24.51% compared to the pre-trained model 24.95%.
4.3 Ablation Study: Informative Outlier Mining
How does informative outlier mining compare to random sampling? We perform an ablation
study that isolates the effect of informative outlier mining. In Table 3, we show that using informative
outlier mining overall works better than random sampling. For example, on CIFAR-10, our method
(q = 0.125) achieves FPR 26.95% under unseen corrupted OOD inputs, compared to random
sampling (45.70%). On natural OOD inputs, our method (q = 0.5) reduces the FPR by 23.15%
on more complex dataset CIFAR-100. This suggests that using adversarial training alone without
informative outlier mining leads to suboptimal performance. We provide theoretical reasoning for the
benefit of outlier mining in Section 5.
How does the sampling parameter affect performance? Table 3 shows the performance where
we vary the sampling interval with different q. The ablation also reveals the importance of sampling
from a mild range of OOD scores. On the one hand, training on OOD inputs primarily with large
OOD scores (i.e., too easy examples with q = 0.75) worsens the performance on CIFAR-10, which
suggests the necessity to include examples on which the OOD detector is uncertain. On the other
hand, training on the hardest examples (i.e., q = 0) with lowest OOD scores might be harmful since
some of the data points resemble in-distribution data, as visually evidenced in Figure 2(c).
Dtestin Model
FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC
(5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR)
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Natural OOD Corruption OOD L∞ OOD Comp. OOD
CIFAR-
10
ATOM (rand. sample) 2.93 99.09 45.70 90.98 52.19 71.13 69.19 73.37
ATOM (q=0.0) 2.54 99.06 40.16 92.87 52.27 65.40 68.30 68.18
ATOM (q=0.125) 2.07 99.11 26.95 94.96 15.31 97.33 36.08 93.78
ATOM (q=0.25) 2.71 99.13 32.21 93.89 25.25 95.47 44.02 92.01
ATOM (q=0.5) 5.03 98.79 40.22 92.64 36.49 92.48 59.38 88.21
ATOM (q=0.75) 7.18 98.41 61.26 87.45 20.80 95.79 62.32 87.18
CIFAR-
100
ATOM (rand. sample) 54.16 88.96 99.88 54.58 62.29 69.94 95.95 44.99
ATOM (q=0.0) 57.46 88.28 99.94 49.84 60.33 76.27 96.56 45.43
ATOM (q=0.125) 47.38 91.62 99.57 63.98 44.75 89.44 90.10 65.54
ATOM (q=0.25) 34.06 93.79 99.08 72.27 52.89 82.61 96.83 68.93
ATOM (q=0.5) 31.01 93.27 97.01 64.05 63.77 76.53 95.87 59.25
ATOM (q=0.75) 33.18 92.46 96.90 64.85 53.16 86.13 96.78 64.63
Table 3: Ablation study on informative outlier mining. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower
value is better. All values are percentages and are averaged over six OOD test datasets mentioned in section 4.1.
We do not use OOD test set for tuning q. Please refer to Table 6 for validation results.
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5 Theoretical Insights
There are two key aspects to our algorithms: (i) Leveraging vast unlabeled outlier data to reduce
the in-distribution sample complexity, and (ii) Mining the informative outliers so that we train with
outliers that are neither too easy (providing no useful information), nor too hard (which may conflict
with the in-distribution data). In this section we provide a simple Gaussian model in which both
points manifest rigorously. Due to lack of space, proofs are deferred to Appendix A, in which we
also give additional bounds without assuming Gaussian data.
Gaussian data model. Given µ ∈ Rd, σ > 0, ν > 0, in our model: (1) PX is N (µ, σ2I); (2) QX
can be any distribution from the family Q = {N (−µ + v, σ2I) : v ∈ Rd, ‖v‖2 ≤ ν}; (3) the
hypothesis class of the OOD detectors is G = {Gθ(x) = sign(θ>x) : θ ∈ Rd}. We also assume the
following parameter values (unless otherwise stated): first choose an integer n0 > 0, then let
 ∈ (0, 1/2), ‖µ‖22 = d n0/4, σ2 =
√
dn0, ν ≤ ‖µ‖2/4. (5)
The parameters ensure the existence of a suitable detector and enable analysis of the benefit of the
auxiliary outlier data for training. We consider the FNR and the FPR under `∞ perturbations of
magnitude . QX is not accessible in training time, so we should bound supQX∈Q FPR(G;QX).
Auxiliary unlabeled data reduces in-distribution sample complexity. Given only in-distribution
data {xi}ni=1, we show a lower bound of the sample size: any algorithm cannot achieve non-trivial
errors with less samples.
Proposition 1. Let An be any learning algorithm mapping a dataset S consisting of n i.i.d. samples
from PX to a detector An(S). Let µ be drawn from N (0, I). If n ≤ n0 · 
2
√
d/n0
16 log d , then
E
{
FNR(An(S)) + sup
QX∈Q
FPR(An(S);QX,Ω∞,(x))
}
≥ 1
2
(1− d−1) (6)
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness in S and An.
Now assume that we additionally have outliers {x˜i}n′i=1 from a distribution UX, which we use for
better estimating the OOD detector. Specifically, UX is defined by first drawing v uniformly at
random from the ball {v : v ∈ Rd, ‖v‖2 ≤ ν}, then drawing x˜ from N (−µ+ v, σ2I). Consider the
detector Gθˆn,n′ given by θˆn,n′ =
1
n+n′
(∑n
i=1 xi −
∑n′
i=1 x˜i
)
.
Proposition 2. There exists a universal constant c such that for the parameter setting (5) with√
d/n0 ≥ c/2, we have that if n ≥ n0 and n′ ≥ n0 · 42
√
d/n0, then
Eθˆn,n′FNR(Gθˆn,n′ ) ≤ 10
−3, Eθˆn,n′ supQX∈Q
FPR(Gθˆn,n′
;QX,Ω∞,(x)) ≤ 10−3. (7)
Proposition 1 and 2 prove a separation of the in-distribution sample sizes for the cases with and
without auxiliary outliers. While the theoretical model is simple, we note that the separation of the
sample sizes in this simple model suggests the same phenomenon can happen in more complicated
and practical settings. This then means the auxiliary outlier data not only can help training but, in fact,
can be necessary for obtaining detectors with good performance given limited in-distribution data.
Appropriate outlier hardness is important. All the data from UX are implicitly related to the
parameter for the ideal detector θ∗ = µ and thus are informative for learning. However, this may not
be the case in practice: typically only part of the auxiliary data are informative, while the remaining
are not very useful or even harmful for learning (see Figure 2). Here we study such an example,
and shows that outlier mining can identify informative data and improve the performance. Here the
auxiliary outliers are from the distribution Umix, a uniform mixture ofN (−µ, σ2I) andN (−µo, σ2I)
with µo = 10µ. Importantly, the distribution Umix models the case where we have vast unlabeled
data, yet with some easy outliers far from in-distribution (most points in N (−µo, σ2I)), and also
with a small probability mass of samples (e.g., tail of N (−µ, σ2I)) in the support of in-distribution.
Clearly, without outlier mining, θˆn,n′ has high errors.
We now consider a method which only tries to pick points with mild confidence scores, which thus
removes too easy outliers (e.g., most points from N (−µo, σ2I)), and too difficult outliers (e.g.,
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some points from the tail of N (−µ, σ2I)). Specifically, we first use in-distribution data to get
an intermediate solution: θˆint = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi. Then, we select outliers x˜ whose confidence scores
f(x˜) = 1/(1 + e−x˜
>θˆint/d) fall in an interval [a, b]. The final solution θˆom is −1 times the average
of the selected outliers. We can prove then that this method yields a good detector:
Proposition 3. There exist thresholds a and b for θˆom, and a universal constant c such that for
the parameter setting (5) with
√
d/n0 ≥ c(log d + 1/2), we have that if n ≥ cn0 log d and
n′ ≥ (d+ n0 · 42)
√
d/n0, then θˆom has the same error guarantees as in Proposition 2.
Intuitively, outliers selected in this way are mostly informative and thus give an accurate final detector,
which justifies outlier mining in the presence of non-informative data.
6 Related Work
Discriminative Based Out-of-Distribution Detection. Hendrycks et al. [19] introduced a baseline
approach for OOD detection using the maximum softmax probability from a pre-trained network.
Several works attempt to improve the OOD uncertainty estimation by using deep ensembles [26],
the calibrated softmax score [29], and the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score [28]. Some
methods also modify the neural networks by re-training or fine-tuning on some auxiliary anomalous
data that are either realistic [20, 33, 36] or artificially generated by GANs [27]. Many other works
[45, 31, 4] also regularize the model to have lower confidence for anomalous examples. Worst-case
aspects of OOD detection have previously been studied in [17, 32, 42]. However, these papers are
primarily concerned with L∞ norm bounded adversarial attacks. In this paper, we consider a broader
family of clean and perturbed OOD inputs to examine the robustness of OOD detection algorithms.
Generative Modeling Based Out-of-distribution Detection. Generative models [11, 23, 40, 50, 48]
can be alternative approaches for detecting OOD examples, as they directly estimate the in-distribution
density and can declare a test sample to be out-of-distribution if it lies in the low-density regions.
However, as shown by [34], deep generative models can assign a high likelihood to out-of-distribution
data. Deep generative models can be more effective for out-of-distribution detection using alternative
metrics [9], likelihood ratio [39, 43], and modified training technique [20]. Recently, [38] shows that
flow-based generative models are sensitive under adversarial attacks. Note that we mainly considered
discriminative-based approaches, which can be more competitive due to the availability of label
information (and, in some cases, auxiliary outlier data [17, 20, 32, 33]).
Adversarial Robustness. Adversarial examples [16, 37, 5, 47] have received considerable attention
in recent years. Many defense methods have been proposed to mitigate this problem. One of the most
effective methods is adversarial training [30], which uses robust optimization techniques to render
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. [8] shows that unlabeled data can improve
adversarial robustness on in-distribution via self-training. Our method is also related to self-training,
but our focus is to improve the generalization and robustness of OOD detection.
Hard Example Mining. Hard example mining was introduced in the work [46] for training face
detection models, where they gradually grow the set of background examples by selecting those
examples for which the detector triggers a false alarm. The idea has been used extensively for object
detection literature [14, 15, 44]. [7] uses hard negative mining for zero-shot classification. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to explore hard example mining for out-of-distribution detection.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Adversarial Training with informative Outlier Mining (ATOM), a method
that enhances the robustness of the OOD detector. We show the merit of adaptively selecting the
OOD training examples which the OOD detector is mildly uncertain about. Extensive experiments
show ATOM can significantly improve the decision boundary of the OOD detector, achieving state-
of-the-art performance under a broad family of clean and perturbed OOD evaluation tasks. We also
provide theoretical analysis that justifies the benefits of outlier mining. Further, our unified evaluation
framework allows future research to examine the robustness of the OOD detector. We hope our
research can raise more attention to a broader view of robustness in out-of-distribution detection.
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Supplementary Material
Robust Out-of-distribution Detection via Informative Outlier Mining
A Theoretical Analysis
A.1 A General Error Bound
The interesting questions related to our method are: (1) why auxiliary data from UX helps? (2) why
the detector G trained on UX generalizes to different OOD distributions QX in test time?
To see what QX can benefit from the auxiliary data, we adopt the domain adaption framework [3].
Recall that in domain adaptation there are two domains s, t, each being a distribution over the input
space X and label space {−1, 1}. A classifier is trained on s then applied on t. At a high level, we
view our OOD detection problem as classification, where the source domain s is PX with labels 1
and UX with labels −1, and the target domain t is PX with labels 1 and QX with label −1.
We focus on the FPR metric below; the argument for FNR is similar. Suppose we learn the OOD
detector from a hypothesis class G. Following [3], we define (a variant) of the divergence of QX and
UX w.r.t. the hypothesis class G as
dG(QX, UX) = sup
G,G′∈G
v(G,G′;QX)− v(G,G′;UX)
where
v(G,G′;D) = FPR(G;D,Ω)− FPR(G′;D,Ω)
is the error difference of G and G′ on the distribution D.
The divergence upper bounds the change of the hypothesis error difference between QX and UX.
If it is small, then for any G,G′ ∈ G where G has a smaller error than G′ in UX, we know that G
will also have a smaller (or not too larger) error than G′ in QX. That is, if the divergence is small,
then the ranking of the hypotheses w.r.t. the error is roughly the same in both distributions. This
rank-preserving property thus makes sure that a good hypothesis learned in UX will also be good for
QX.
Now we show that, if dG(QX, UX) is small (i.e., QX and UX are aligned w.r.t. the class G), then a
detector G with small FPR on UX will also have small FPR on QX.
Proposition 4. For any G ∈ G,
FPR(G;QX,Ω) ≤ inf
G∗∈G
FPR(G∗;QX,Ω) + FPR(G;UX,Ω) + dG(QX, UX).
Proof. For simplicity, we omit Ω from FPR(G;QX,Ω). For any G∗ ∈ G, we have
FPR(G;QX) = FPR(G
∗;QX) + FPR(G;QX)− FPR(G∗;QX) (8)
= FPR(G∗;QX) + FPR(G;UX)− FPR(G∗;UX) (9)
+ [(FPR(G;QX)− FPR(G∗;QX))− (FPR(G;UX)− FPR(G∗;UX))]. (10)
The last term is
(FPR(G;QX)− FPR(G∗;QX))− (FPR(G;UX)− FPR(G∗;UX)) (11)
= v(G,G∗;QX)− v(G,G∗;UX) (12)
≤ dG(QX, UX). (13)
Therefore,
FPR(G;QX) ≤ FPR(G∗;QX) + FPR(G;UX) + dG(QX, UX). (14)
Taking inf over G∗ ∈ G completes the proof.
The error of the detector is bounded by three terms: the best error, the error on the training distributions,
and the divergence between QX and UX. Assuming that there exists a ground-truth detector with
a small test error, and that the optimization can lead to a small training error, the test error is then
characterized by the divergence. So in this case, as long as the rankings of the hypotheses (according
to the error) on QX and UX are similar, detectors learned on UX can generalize to QX.
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Figure 3: An illustration example to explain why UX helps to get a good detector Gr . With UX, we can
prune away hypotheses Gr for any r ≥ 1.9. Thus, the resulting detector Gr can detect OOD samples from QX
successfully and robustly.
An illustration example. In this example, the in-distribution PX is uniform over the disk around
the origin in R2 with radius 1, UX is uniform over the disk around (0, 3) with radius 1, and QX
is uniform over the disk around (3, 0) with radius 1. Assume the adversary budget is  = 0.1, i.e.,
Ω∞, = {‖δ‖∞ ≤ 0.1}. The hypothesis class for the detector contains all functions of the form
Gr(x) = 2I[‖x‖2 ≤ r]− 1 with parameter r. See Figure 3.
The example first shows the effect of the auxiliary outlier data: UX helps prune away hypotheses Gr
for any r ≥ 1.9. Furthermore, it also shows how learning over UX can generalize to QX. Although
QX and UX have non-overlapping supports, UX helps to calibrate the error of the hypotheses, so any
good detector trained on PX and UX can be used for distinguishing PX and QX. Formally, the dG is
small in Proposition 4.
The analysis also shows the importance of training on perturbed instances from the unlabeled data UX.
Not using perturbation is equivalent to using Ω = {0}. In this case, the analysis shows that it only
guarantees the error on unperturbed instances from QX, even if QX and UX has small divergence
and the learned detector can have small training error on UX.
A.2 Analysis in a Gaussian Model
To understand how the outlier training data affect the generalization, we study a concrete distributional
model, which is inspired by the models in [41, 8]. In this model, we establish a separation of the
in-distribution sample sizes needed in the two cases: with and without auxiliary outlier data for
training. We also demonstrate the benefit of outlier mining when the auxiliary data consists of
uninformative outliers.
While the theoretical model is simple (in fact, much simpler than the practical data distributions), its
simplicity is actually desired for our analytical purpose. More precisely, the separation of the sample
sizes under this simple model suggests the same phenomenon can happen in more complicated
models. This then means the auxiliary outlier data not only help training but are necessary for
obtaining detectors with reasonable performance when in-distribution data is limited.
Gaussian Model. To specify a distributional model for our robust OOD formulation, we need
in-distribution PX, family of OOD distributions Q, and the hypothesis classH for the OOD detector
G. When auxiliary data is available, we also need to specify their distribution UX. Let µ ∈ Rd be the
mean vector, σ > 0 be the variance parameter, and ν > 0 be a parameter. In our (µ, σ, ν)-Gaussian
model:
• PX is N (µ, σ2I).
• Q = {N (−µ+ v, σ2I) : v ∈ Rd, ‖v‖2 ≤ ν}.
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• H = {Gθ(x) = sign(θ>x) : θ ∈ Rd}. Here Gθ(x) = 1 means it predicts x to be an
in-distribution example, and Gθ(x) = −1 means it predicts an OOD example.
We are interested in the False Negative Rate FNR(G) and worst False Positive Rate
supQX∈Q FPR(G;QX,Ω∞,(x)) over QX ∈ Q under `∞ perturbations of magnitude . For sim-
plicity, we denote them as FNR(G) and FPR(G;QX) in our proofs.
Parameter Setting. The model parameters are set such that:
1. There exists a classifier that achieves very low errors FPR and FNR.
2. We need n1 in-distribution data from PX to learn a classifier with non-trivial robust errors.
3. Using n0 in-distribution examples from PX and nout auxiliary outliers from UX where n0
is much smaller than n1, we can learn a classifier with non-trivial robust errors.
Here n0, n1, nout are sample sizes whose values are specified later in our analysis.
To achieve the three goals, the following parameter values are used (repeating (5)):
 ∈ (0, 1/2), ‖µ‖22 = d n0/4, σ2 =
√
dn0, ν ≤ ‖µ‖2/4. (15)
To interpret the parameter setting, one can view  as fixed and d/n0 as a large number. In the
following subsections, we show how these three goals are achieved.
A.2.1 Existence of Robust Classifier
We give closed forms of the errors, and show that using θ = µ gives small errors under the chosen
parameter setting in (5).
Closed Forms of the Errors. By definition, the FNR of a detector Gθ (on PX) is:
FNR(Gθ) = Px∼PX [θ>x ≤ 0] = Px∼PX
[
N
(
µ>θ
σ‖θ‖2 , 1
)
≤ 0
]
=: Φ
(
µ>θ
σ‖θ‖2
)
(16)
where
Φ(x) :=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2/2dt (17)
is the Gaussian error function.
Given a test OOD distribution Qv = N (−µ+ v, σ2I), the robust FPR of Gθ on Qv is:
FPR(Gθ;Qv) = Px∼Qv
[
inf
‖δ‖∞≤
θ>(x+ δ) ≥ 0
]
(18)
= Px∼Qv
[
θ>x+ ‖θ‖1 ≥ 0
]
(19)
= Px∼Qv
[N ((µ+ v)>θ, (σ‖θ‖2)2) ≥ −‖θ‖1] (20)
= Φ
(
(µ+ v)>θ
σ‖θ‖2 −
‖θ‖1
σ‖θ‖2
)
. (21)
Then the worst robust FPR of Gθ on Q is:
sup
Qv∈Q
FPR(Gθ;Qv) = sup
‖v‖2≤ν
Φ
(
(µ+ v)>θ
σ‖θ‖2 −
‖θ‖1
σ‖θ‖2
)
(22)
= Φ
(
µ>θ
σ‖θ‖2 −
ν
σ
− ‖θ‖1
σ‖θ‖2
)
(23)
≤ Φ
(
µ>θ
σ‖θ‖2 −
ν
σ
− 
√
d
σ
)
. (24)
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Small Errors of Gµ. Given the closed forms, we can now show that Gµ achieves small FNR and
FPR in our parameter setting.
FNR(Gµ) = Φ
(‖µ‖2
σ
)
= Φ
((
d
n0
)1/4)
≤ e− 12
√
d/n0 . (25)
sup
Qv∈Q
FPR(Gµ;Qv) ≤ Φ
(
‖µ‖2
σ
− ν
σ
− 
√
d
σ
)
(26)
≤ Φ
((
1− 1
4
− 
)(
d
n0
)1/4)
≤ e− 132
√
d/n0 . (27)
Therefore, in the regime d/n0  1, the detector Gµ achieves both small FNR on PX and robust FPR
on any test OOD distribution in Q.
A.2.2 Learning Without Auxiliary Outlier Data
Given in-distribution data x1,x2, . . . ,xn, we consider the detector Gθˆn given by
θˆn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi. (28)
As shown in the closed form solutions, the key factor determining the errors is µ
>θˆn
σ‖θˆn‖2 . To bound this
term, we cite the following lemma from existing work:
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 in [8] ). There exist numerical constants c0, c1, c2 such that under parameter
setting (5) and d/n0 > c0,
µ>θˆn
σ‖θˆn‖2
≥
(√
n0
d
+
n0
n
(
1 + c1
(n0
d
)1/8))−1/2
(29)
with probability ≥ 1− e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n,(d/n0)1/4}.
This lemma leads to the following guarantee about learning the OOD detector from in-distribution
data only. The error bound 10−3 is chosen for simplicity of the statement, but it can be made to
arbitrarily small values.
Proposition 5. There exists a universal constant c such that for the parameter setting (5) with√
d/n0 ≥ c/2, we have that if n ≥ n0 · 42
√
d/n0, then
EθˆnFNR(Gθˆn) ≤ 10−3, Eθˆn sup
QX∈Q
FPR(Gθˆn ;QX,Ω∞,(x)) ≤ 10−3. (30)
Proof. By Lemma 1, we have
µ>θˆn
σ‖θˆn‖2
≥
(
2
(√
n0
n
+
√
n0
d
))−1/2
(31)
with probability≥ 1−e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n,(d/n0)1/4}. The proposition then comes from the parameter
setting (5) and the closed form expressions (16) and (22) of the errors.
Next we show that the above sample size is nearly optimal (up to a logarithmic factor). That is, a
sample size of order n0 · 
2
√
d/n0
log d is necessary for all algorithms to obtain both non-trivial robust
FPR and FNR. We emphasize that this lower bound is information theoretic, i.e., it holds without
restriction on the computational power of the learning algorithm and the hypothesis class used for the
OOD detector. In particular, it applies not only to the linear classifier considered in Proposition 5 but
also to any other learning algorithms.
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Proposition 1. Let An be any learning algorithm mapping a dataset S consisting of n i.i.d. samples
from PX to a detector An(S). Let µ be drawn from N (0, I). If n ≤ n0 · 
2
√
d/n0
16 log d , then
E
{
FNR(An(S)) + sup
QX∈Q
FPR(An(S);QX,Ω∞,(x))
}
≥ 1
2
(1− d−1) (6)
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness in S and An.
Proof. The key for the proof is the observation that robust classification is a special case of our
robust OOD problem. More precisely, consider the following robust classification problem. The data
(x, y) with x ∈ Rd and y ∈ {−1,+1} is generated as follows: first draw y uniformly at random,
and then draw x from N (y · µ, σ2I). Given training data {(xi, yi)}ni=1, the goal is to find classifier
fθ(x) = sign(θ
>x) with small robust classification error
err∞,(fθ) = E(x,y) max‖δ‖∞≤
I[fθ(x+ δ) 6= y]
under `∞ perturbation of magnitude . It has been shown that (Theorem 6 in [41] or Theorem 1
in [8]) that when µ ∼ N (0, I) and n ≤ n0 · 
2
√
d/n0
8 log d and with the parameter setting (5), for any
learning algorithm An
Eerr∞,(An(S)) ≥ 1
2
(1− d−1). (32)
Now consider the following variant of the robust OOD problem in the proposition. Suppose besides
the data from PX, we also have n i.i.d. samples from a test OOD distribution Q0 = N (−µ, σ2I).
Then the above robust classification problem can be reduced to this variant of robust OOD, by viewing
the in-distribution data as with label +1 and viewing outliers as with label −1. Furthermore, it is
clear that the sum of the FNR and FPR is larger than the robust classification error. Then
E {FNR(An(S)) + FPR(An(S);Q0)} ≥ 1
2
(1− d−1). (33)
Since this variant can be reduced to the original robust OOD problem in the proposition and further-
more Q0 ∈ Q, the statement then follows.
A.2.3 Learning With Auxiliary Outlier Data
Assuming we have access to auxiliary outliers from a distribution UX where:
• UX is defined by the following distribution: first draw v uniformly at random from the ball
{v : v ∈ Rd, ‖v‖2 ≤ ν}, then draw x˜ from N (−µ+ v, σ2I).
Roughly speaking, UX is a uniform mixture of distributions in Q.
Given in-distribution data x1,x2, . . . ,xn from PX and auxiliary outliers x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n′ from UX,
we consider the detector Gθˆn,n′ given by
θˆn,n′ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi − 1
n′
n′∑
i=1
x˜i. (34)
We will show that with n = n0 and sufficiently large n′, the detector has small errors.
Again, as shown in the closed form solutions, the key factor determining the errors is µ
>θˆn,n′
σ‖θˆn,n′‖2
. The
following lemma bounds this term.
Lemma 2. There exist numerical constants c0, c1, c2 such that under parameter setting (5) and
d/n0 > c0,
µ>θˆn,n′
σ‖θˆn,n′‖2
≥
(√
n0
d
+
n0
n+ n′
(
1 + c1
(n0
d
)1/8))−1/2
(35)
with probability ≥ 1− e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n+n′,(d/n0)1/4} − e−c2n′ .
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Proof. The proof follows the argument of Lemma 1 in [8] but needs some modifications accommo-
dating the difference in learning θ. Recall the generation of x′i: first draw vi uniformly at random
from the ball B(ν) := {v : v ∈ Rd, ‖v‖2 ≤ ν}, then draw x¯′i from N (µ, σ2I), and finally let
x′i = vi − x¯′i. So we have
θˆn,n′ =
1
n+ n′
 n∑
i=1
xi +
n′∑
i=1
x¯′i
− 1
n+ n′
 n′∑
i=1
vi
 (36)
= µ+ δ + δv (37)
where
δ =
1
n+ n′
 n∑
i=1
xi +
n′∑
i=1
x¯′i
− µ ∼ N (0, σ2
n+ n′
I), (38)
δv = − 1
n+ n′
 n′∑
i=1
vi
 . (39)
To lower bound the term µ
>θˆn,n′
‖θˆn,n′‖2
, we upper bound its squared inverse:
‖θˆn,n′‖22
(µ>θˆn,n′)2
=
‖µ+ δ + δv‖22
(‖µ‖22 + µ>δ + µ>δv)2
(40)
=
1
‖µ‖22
+
‖δ + δv‖22 − 1‖µ‖22 (µ
>δ + µ>δv)2
(‖µ‖22 + µ>δ + µ>δv)2
(41)
≤ 1‖µ‖22
+
2‖δ‖22 + 2‖δv‖22
(‖µ‖22 + µ>δ + µ>δv)2
. (42)
For δ, we have
‖δ‖22 ∼
σ2
n+ n′
χ2d and
µ>δ
‖µ‖2 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2
n+ n′
)
. (43)
So standard concentration bounds give
P
(
‖δ‖22 ≥
σ2
n+ n′
(
d+
1
σ
))
≤ e−d/8σ2 and P
(
µ>δ
‖µ‖2 ≥ (σ‖µ‖)
1/2
)
≤ 2e−(n+n′)‖µ‖2/2σ.
(44)
For δv , by subguassian concentration bounds, we have
P
(
‖δv‖2 ≥ Cν√
n′
)
≤ e−cn′ (45)
for some numeric constants c and C. Suppose the event ‖δv‖2 < Cν√n′ is true. Then
|µ>δv| ≤ ‖µ‖2‖δv‖2 ≤ Cν‖µ‖2√
n′
. (46)
Plugging the concentration bounds in (40) and doing the same manipulation leads to the bound. To
finish the proof, we also need to show µ>θˆn,n′ > 0, which can be shown by the same argument as
in [8].
We then get the following guarantee. Again, the error bound 10−3 is chosen for simplicity of the
statement, but it can be made to arbitrarily small values.
Proposition 2. There exists a universal constant c such that for the parameter setting (5) with√
d/n0 ≥ c/2, we have that if n ≥ n0 and n′ ≥ n0 · 42
√
d/n0, then
Eθˆn,n′FNR(Gθˆn,n′ ) ≤ 10
−3, Eθˆn,n′ supQX∈Q
FPR(Gθˆn,n′
;QX,Ω∞,(x)) ≤ 10−3. (7)
Proof. The proposition comes from Lemma 2, the parameter setting (5), and the closed form expres-
sions (16) and (22) of the errors.
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A.3 Benefit of Outlier Mining
The above Gaussian example shows the benefit of having auxiliary outlier data for training. All
the auxiliary data given in the example are implicitly related to the ideal parameter for the detector
θ∗ = µ and thus are informative for learning the detector. However, this may not be the case in
practice: typically only part of the auxiliary outlier data are informative, while the remaining are
not very useful or even can be harmful for the learning. In this section, we study such an example,
and shows that how outlier mining can help to identify informative data and improve the learning
performance.
Suppose the algorithm gets n in-distribution data {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} i.i.d. from PX and n′ auxiliary
outliers {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n′} for training. Instead of from UX specified above, the auxiliary outliers are
i.i.d. from the distribution Umix.
• Umix is a uniform mixture of N (−µ, σ2I) and N (−µo, σ2I) for µo = 10µ.
That is, the distribution is defined by the following process: with probability 1/2 sample the outlier
from the informative part N (−µ, σ2I), and with probability 1/2 sample the outlier from the uninfor-
mative part N (−µo, σ2I). We also note that µ0 = 10µ is chosen for simplicity of analysis. µ0 can
also be cµ for some sufficiently large c > 1, or even µo = cµ+ c′µ⊥ for a sufficiently large c > 1, a
small c′ and a unit vector µ⊥ perpendicular to µ.
Naı¨ve Method Without Outlier Mining. It is clear that naı¨vely applying the method in the previ-
ous section can lead to high errors: with n in-distribution examples from PX and n′ = n auxiliary
outliers from Umix, when n→∞, we have θˆn,n′ → −7µ/4 which has the worst errors among all
detectors.
With Outlier Mining. Here we analyze the following algorithm using the outlier mining approach.
The algorithm is simpler than what we used in Section 3 but shares the same intuition.
First, we use the n in-distribution data points to get an intermediate solution:
θˆint =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi. (47)
We define the confidence score of a point x˜ being in-distribution as:
f(x˜) = σ(t) =
1
1 + e−t
, where t(x˜) =
x˜>θˆint
d
. (48)
Here σ(t) = 11+e−t is the sigmoid function. We then select outlier training data whose confidence
fall into an interval [a, b] and use them to learn the final solution:
θˆom =
∑n′
i=1(−x˜i)I{f(x˜i) ∈ [a, b]}∑n′
i=1 I{f(x˜i) ∈ [a, b]}
(49)
where I{·} is the indicator function.
Proposition 3. There exist thresholds a and b for θˆom, and a universal constant c such that for
the parameter setting (5) with
√
d/n0 ≥ c(log d + 1/2), we have that if n ≥ cn0 log d and
n′ ≥ (d+ n0 · 42)
√
d/n0, then θˆom has the same error guarantees as in Proposition 2.
Proof. Let a = σ(−3/2), b = σ(−1/2). By definition we have
δom := θˆom − µ =
∑n′
i=1(−µ− x˜i)I{f(x˜i) ∈ [a, b]}∑n′
i=1 I{f(x˜i) ∈ [a, b]}
. (50)
By the closed form expressions (16) and (22) of the errors, it is sufficient to lower bound the key term
µ>θˆom
‖θˆom‖2 , which comes down to show that δom is small.
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First, let’s consider θˆint. Let δint := θˆint − µ. Then
‖δint‖22 ∼
σ2
n
χ2d and
µ>δint
‖µ‖2 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2
n
)
. (51)
So standard concentration bounds give
P
(
‖δint‖22 ≥
σ2
n
(
d+
1
σ
))
≤ e−d/8σ2 and P
(
|µ>δint|
‖µ‖2 ≥
√
d
n
)
≤ 2e−d/2σ2 . (52)
So with probability ≥ 1− 3e−d/8σ2 over the randomness of the n in-distribution points, we have the
good event Gint: ‖δint‖22 ≤ σ
2
n
(
d+ 1σ
)
and |µ
>δint|
‖µ‖2 ≤
√
d
n .
Now, condition on a fix θˆint satisfying Gint, and consider θˆom. Define
zi := −µ− x˜i, (53)
I0i := I{f(x˜i) ∈ [a, b]}, (54)
I1i := I{x˜i is from N (−µ, σ2I)}, (55)
I2i := I{x˜i is from N (−µo, σ2I)}. (56)
For simplicity, let’s omit the subscript i and consider a sample x˜ from Umix, and the corresponding
variables z, I0, I1, and I2. Since I1 + I2 = 1,
(−µ− x˜)I{f(x˜) ∈ [a, b]} = zI0I1 + zI0I2. (57)
Case 1. Let’s first consider the case when x˜ is from N (−µ, σ2I). More precisely, we condition
on a fixed θˆint and condition on I1 = 1. Then z ∼ N (0, σ2I) and it can be decomposed along the
direction θ¯int := θˆint/‖θˆint‖2 as follows:
z = s · θ¯int + z2 (58)
where s ∼ N (0, σ2) and z2 is a Gaussian distribution in the subspace orthogonal to θ¯int. Then
t(x˜) =
x˜>θˆint
d
= −µ
>θˆint
d
− s‖θˆint‖2
d
. (59)
Therefore, we have
E[zI0I1|I1 = 1, θˆint] = E[s · θ¯intI0|I1 = 1, θˆint] + E[z2I0|I1 = 1, θˆint] (60)
Clearly the second term is 0 since z2I0 is symmetric. So
E[zI0I1|I1 = 1, θˆint] = E[s · θ¯intI{f(x˜) ∈ [a, b]}|I1 = 1, θˆint] (61)
= E
[
s · I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}|I1 = 1, θˆint
]
· θ¯int (62)
= E [s · I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}] · θ¯int (63)
where
a′ = − µ
>θˆint
‖θˆint‖2
− σ
−1(b)d
‖θˆint‖2
(64)
=
−2µ>θˆint + d
2‖θˆint‖2
(65)
=
−2µ>δint − d
2‖θˆint‖2
, (66)
b′ = − µ
>θˆint
‖θˆint‖2
− σ
−1(a)d
‖θˆint‖2
(67)
=
−2µ>θˆint + 3d
2‖θˆint‖2
(68)
=
−2µ>δint + d
2‖θˆint‖2
. (69)
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By the bound on |µ>δint|, we have
|E [s · I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}] | ≤
∫ d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(1+2/
√
n)
d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(1−2/√n)
σt
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt (70)
≤ σ d
σ‖θˆint‖2
1√
2pi
e
− 12
(
d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(1−2/√n)
)2
(71)
≤ d‖θˆint‖2
e
− d2
32σ2‖θˆint‖22 (72)
Given the bound on ‖δint‖22, we have
‖θˆint‖2 ≤ ‖µ‖2 + ‖δint‖2 ≤
√
d+
√
σ2
n
(
d+
1
σ
)
≤
√
d+
√
2σ2d
n
. (73)
Since n ≥ Cn0 log d and d ≥ C2n0 log2 d for a sufficiently large C, we have
σ2‖θˆint‖22
d2
≤ σ
2d(1 +
√
2σ2/n)2
d2
≤ 2
√
n0
d
+
4n0
n
≤ 6
C log d
(74)
and thus
|E [s · I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}] | ≤ 1
d2
. (75)
Combining with E[zI0I1|I1 = 0, θˆint] = 0 we get
E[zI0I1|θˆint] = c1 · θ¯int (76)
for some c1 satisfying |c1| ≤ 1/d2. Furthermore, zI0I1 | θˆint is truncated Gaussian and thus is
sub-Gaussian with sub-Gaussian norm bounded by σ. Then by sub-Gaussian concentration bounds,
we have
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
µ>ziI0iI1i −
n′∑
i=1
µ>E[ziI0iI1i|θˆint]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ √n′d | θˆint
 ≤ e−cd/σ2 , (77)
P
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n′∑
i=1
ziI0iI1i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ 4σ
√
n′d+ 2
√
n′d | θˆint
 ≤ e−d/σ2 . (78)
for some constant c > 0. In other words, with probability ≥ 1− 2e−cd/σ2 , we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
µ>ziI0iI1i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ √n′d+ n
′
d3/2
, (79)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n′∑
i=1
ziI0iI1i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 6σ
√
n′d. (80)
Conditioned on I1 = 1, we also have
E[I0I1|I1 = 1, θˆint] = P(s ∈ [a′, b′]) (81)
≥
∫ d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(1−2/√n)
d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(−1+2/√n)
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt (82)
≥ 1− 2
∫ +∞
d
4σ‖θˆint‖2
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt (83)
≥ 1− 2
∫ +∞
√
C log d
12
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt (84)
≥ 1− 1
d
. (85)
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Let m = n
′
2
(
1− 1d
)
. Then by Chernoff’s bound, we have
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
I0iI1i −m
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12m
 ≤ e−c′m (86)
for an absolute constant c′ > 0. That is, with probality ≥ 1− e−cn′ , we have∑n′i=1 I0iI1i ≥ n′/5.
Case 2. Next, let’s consider the case when x˜ is from N (−µo, σ2I). More precisely, we condition
on a fixed θˆint and condition on I2 = 1. Similar to case 1, we have
z = 9µ+ s · θ¯int + z2 (87)
where s ∼ N (0, σ2) and z2 is a Gaussian distribution in the subspace orthogonal to θ¯int. So
E[(z − 9µ)I0I2|I2 = 1, θˆint] = E[sI0|I2 = 1, θˆint] · θ¯int. (88)
For this,
E[sI{f(x˜) ∈ [a, b]}|I2 = 1, θˆint] · θ¯int = E [s · I{s ∈ [a′′, b′′]}] · θ¯int (89)
where
a′′ =
−20µ>δint − 19d
2‖θˆint‖2
, (90)
b′′ =
−20µ>δint − 17d
2‖θˆint‖2
. (91)
By the bound on |µ>δint| and ‖δint‖2, we have
|E [s · I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}] | ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ −d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(17−20/√n)
−d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(19+20/
√
n)
σt
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (92)
≤ σ 20d
σ‖θˆint‖2
1√
2pi
e
− 12
(
16d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
)2
(93)
≤ 20d‖θˆint‖2
e
− 32d2
σ2‖θˆint‖22 (94)
≤ 1
d2
. (95)
We also have ∣∣∣E [I0I2|I2 = 1, θˆint]∣∣∣ = |E [I{s ∈ [a′, b′]}] | (96)
≤
∫ −d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(17−20/√n)
−d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(19+20/
√
n)
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt (97)
≤ d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
(2 + 40/
√
n)
1√
2pi
e
− 12
(
16d
2σ‖θˆint‖2
)2
(98)
≤ 1
d3
. (99)
Combining the above, we have
E[(z − 9µ)I0I2|θˆint] = c1 · θ¯int (100)
for a constant c1 satisfying |c1| ≤ 1/d2. Furthermore, (z − 9µ)I0I2 | θˆint is truncated Gaussian and
thus is sub-Gaussian with sub-Gaussian norm bounded by σ. Then by sub-Gaussian concentration
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bounds, we have
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
µ>(zi − 9µ)I0iI2i −
n′∑
i=1
µ>E[(zi − 9µ)I0iI2i|θˆint]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ √n′d | θˆint
 ≤ e−cd/σ2 , (101)
P
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n′∑
i=1
(zi − 9µ)I0iI2i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ 4σ
√
n′d+ 2
√
n′d | θˆint
 ≤ e−d/σ2 , (102)
for some constant c > 0. Also by Hoeffding’s bound, we have
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
I0iI2i −
n′∑
i=1
E[I0iI2i|θˆint]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥√n′d/σ2 | θˆint
 ≤ 2e−2d/σ2 . (103)
In other words, with probability ≥ 1− 4e−cd/σ2 , we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
n′∑
i=1
µ>ziI0iI2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ √n′d+ 9d√n′dσ2 + n
′
d2
√
d+ 9d · n
′
d3
≤
√
n′d
(
1 +
9d
σ
)
+
n′
d3/2
, (104)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n′∑
i=1
ziI0iI2i
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 6σ
√
n′d+ 9
√
d
(√
n′d
σ2
+
n′
d3
)
≤
√
n′d
(
6σ + 9
√
d
σ2
)
+
9n′
d5/2
. (105)
Combining (77)(78)(86) and (104)(105) together, we get with probability ≥ 1− Ce−cd/σ2 ,
|µ>δom| ≤ C
√
d
n′
(
1 +
9d
σ
)
+
C
d3/2
, (106)
‖δom‖2 ≤ C
√
d
n′
(
6σ + 9
√
d
σ2
)
+
C
d5/2
. (107)
Then µ
>θˆom
‖θˆom‖2 can be lower bounded by
µ>θˆom
‖θˆom‖2
=
µ>µ+ µ>δom
‖µ+ δom‖2 (108)
≥ µ
>µ+ µ>δom
‖µ‖2 + ‖δom‖2 (109)
≥ d(1− 1/
√
d)√
d(1 + 1/
√
d)
(110)
≥
√
d
(
1− 2√
d
)
. (111)
The proof is completed by plugging the above into the closed form expressions (16) and (22) of the
errors.
B Details of Experiments
B.1 Experimental Settings
Software and Hardware. We run all experiments with PyTorch and NVDIA GeForce RTX 2080Ti
GPUs.
Number of Evaluation Runs. We run all experiments once with fixed random seeds.
In-distribution Dataset. We use CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [24] as in-distribution datasets that
have 10 and 100 classes, respectively. Both datasets consist of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test
images.
OOD Test Dataset. We provide the details of OOD test datasets below. All images are of size
32× 32.
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Method Training Evaluation
MSP 2.5 h 4 h
ODIN 2.5 h 4 h
Mahalanobis 2.5 h 20 h
SOFL 14 h 4 h
OE 5 h 4 h
ACET 17 h 4 h
CCU 6.7 h 4 h
ROWL 24 h 4 h
ATOM (ours) 21 h 4 h
Table 4: The estimated average runtime for each result. h means hour. For MSP, ODIN, and Mahalanobis, we
use standard training. The evaluation includes four OOD detection tasks listed in Section 2.
1. SVHN. The SVHN dataset [35] contains color images of house numbers. There are ten
classes of digits 0-9. The original test set has 26,032 images. We randomly select 1,000 test
images for each class and form a new test dataset of 10,000 images for evaluation.
2. Textures. The Describable Textures Dataset (DTD) [10] contains textural images in the
wild. We include the entire collection of 5640 images for evaluation.
3. Places365. The Places365 dataset [53] contains large-scale photographs of scenes with 365
scene categories. There are 900 images per category in the test set. We randomly sample
10,000 images from the test set for evaluation.
4. LSUN (crop) and LSUN (resize). The Large-scale Scene UNderstanding dataset (LSUN)
has a testing set of 10,000 images of 10 different scenes [52]. We construct two datasets,
LSUN-C and LSUN-R, by randomly cropping image patches of size 32×32 and downsampling
each image to size 32× 32, respectively.
5. iSUN. The iSUN [51] consists of a subset of SUN images. We include the entire collection
of 8925 images in iSUN.
Architectures and Training Configurations. We use the state-of-the-art neural network architecture
DenseNet [21]. We follow the same setup as in [21], with depth L = 100, growth rate k = 12
(Dense-BC) and dropout rate 0. All neural networks are trained with stochastic gradient descent with
Nesterov momentum [12, 22]. Specifically, we train Dense-BC for 100 epochs with momentum 0.9
and `2 weight decay with a coefficient of 10−4. The initial learning rate of 0.1 decays by 0.1 at 50,
75, 90 epoch. We use batch size 64 for in-distribution data and 128 for out-of-distribution data. To
solve the inner max of the robust training objective, we use PGD with  = 8/255, the number of
iterations of 5, the step size of 2/255, and random start.
B.2 Average Runtime
We run our experiments using a single GPU on a machine with 4 GPUs and 32 cores. The estimated
average runtime for each method is summarized in Table 4.
B.3 OOD Detection Methods
Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP). Hendrycks et al. [19] propose to use maxi Fi(x) as confi-
dence scores to detect OOD examples, where F (x) is the softmax output of the neural network.
ODIN. Liang et al. [29] computes calibrated confidence scores using temperature scaling and input
perturbation techniques. We choose temperature scaling parameter T and perturbation magnitude
η by validating on a random noise data, which does not depend on prior knowledge of test OOD
datasets. In all of our experiments, we set T = 1000. We set η = 0.0014 for CIFAR-10, and
η = 0.0028 for CIFAR-100.
Mahalanobis. Lee et al. [28] propose to use Mahalanobis distance-based confidence scores to
detect OOD samples. We use 500 examples randomly selected from Dtrainin and adversarial examples
generated by FGSM [16] with perturbation size of 0.05 to train the Logistic Regression model and
tune the noise perturbation magnitude η. η is chosen from 21 evenly spaced numbers between 0 and
0.004, and the optimal parameters are chosen to minimize the FPR at FNR 5%.
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Outlier Exposure (OE). Outlier Exposure [20] makes use of a large, unlabeled dataset Dauxiliaryout
to enhance the performance of existing OOD detection. We train from scratch for 100 epochs
with λ = 0.5, and use in-distribution batch size of 64 and out-distribution batch size of 128 in our
experiments.
Self-Supervised OOD Feature Learning (SOFL). Mohseni et al. [33] add an auxiliary head to the
network and train in for the OOD detection task. They first use a full-supervised training to learn
in-distribution training data for the main classification head and then a self-supervised training with
OOD training set for the auxiliary head. Following the original setting, we set λ = 5 and use an
in-distribution batch size of 64 and an out-distribution batch size of 320 in all of our experiments. In
CIFAR-10, we use 5 reject classes, while in CIFAR-100, we use 10 reject classes. In CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100, we train the model for 100 epochs with the full-supervised training and then continue
to train for 100 epochs with the self-supervised OOD feature learning. We use the large, unlabeled
dataset Dauxiliaryout as out-of-distribution training dataset.
Adversarial Confidence Enhancing Training (ACET). Hein et al. [17] propose Adversarial Con-
fidence Enhancing Training to enforce low model confidence for the OOD data point, as well as
worst-case adversarial example in the neighborhood of an OOD example. We use the large, unlabeled
dataset Dauxiliaryout as an OOD training dataset instead of using random noise data for a fair comparison.
In all of our experiments, we train for 100 epochs and set λ = 1.0. For both in-distribution and
out-distribution, we use a batch size of 128. To solve the inner max of the training objective, we also
apply PGD with  = 8/255, the number of iterations of 5, the step size of 2/255, and random start
to a half of a minibatch while keeping the other half clean to ensure proper performance on both
perturbed and clean OOD examples for a fair comparison.
Certified Certain Uncertainty (CCU). Certified Certain Uncertainty [32] gives guarantees on the
confidence of the classifier decision far away from the training data. We use the same training set up
as in the paper and code, except for an architectural difference (DenseNet).
Robust Open-World Deep Learning (ROWL). Sehwag et al. [42] propose to introduce additional
background classes for OOD datasets and perform adversarial training on both the in- and out-of-
distribution datasets to achieve robust open-world classification. When an input is classified as the
background classes, it is considered as an OOD example. Thus, ROWL gives binary OOD scores
(either 0 or 1) to the inputs. In our experiments, we only have one background class and randomly
sample data points from the large, unlabeled dataset Dauxiliaryout to form the OOD dataset. To ensure
data balance across classes, we include 5,000 OOD data points for CIFAR-10; while for CIFAR-100,
we include 500 OOD data points. During training, we mix the in-distribution data and OOD data, use
a batch size of 128, and train for 100 epochs. To solve the inner max of the training objective, we use
PGD with  = 8/255, the number of iterations of 5, the step size of 2/255, and random start.
B.4 Adversarial Attacks for OOD Detection Methods
We propose adversarial attack objectives for different OOD detection methods. We consider a family
of adversarial perturbations for the OOD inputs: (1) L∞-norm bounded attack (white-box attack);
(2) common image corruptions attack (black-box attack); (3) compositional attack which combines
common image corruptions attack and L∞ norm bounded attack (white-box attack).
L∞ norm bounded attack. For data point x ∈ Rd, the L∞ norm bounded perturbation is defined as
Ω∞,(x) = {δ ∈ Rd
∣∣ ‖δ‖∞ ≤  ∧ x+ δ is valid}, (112)
where  is the adversarial budget. x+ δ is considered valid if the values of x+ δ are in the image
pixel value range.
For MSP, ODIN, OE, ACET, and CCU methods, we propose the following attack objective to generate
adversarial OOD example on a clean OOD input x:
x′ = arg max
x′∈Ω∞,(x)
− 1
K
K∑
i=1
logF (x′)i (113)
where F (x) is the softmax output of the classifier network.
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For Mahalanobis method, we propose the following attack objective to generate adverasrial OOD
example on OOD input x:
x′ = arg max
x′∈Ω∞,(x)
− log 1
1 + e−(
∑
` α`M`(x
′)+b) , (114)
where M`(x′) is the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score of x′ from the `-th feature layer,
{α`} and b are the parameters of the logistic regression model.
For SOFL method, we propose the following attack objective to generate adversarial OOD example
for an input x:
x′ = arg max
x′∈Ω∞,(x)
− log
K+R∑
i=K+1
F¯ (x′)i (115)
where F¯ (x) is the softmax output of the whole neural network (including auxiliary head) and R is
the number of reject classes.
For ROWL and ATOM method, we propose the following attack objective to generate adverasrial
OOD example on OOD input x:
x′ = arg max
x′∈Ω∞,(x)
− log Fˆ (x′)K+1 (116)
where Fˆ (x) is the softmax output of the (K+1)-way neural network.
We use PGD with  = 8/255, the number of iterations of 40, the step size of 1/255 and random start
to solve these attack objectives.
Common Image Corruptions attack. We use common image corruptions introduced in [18].
We apply 15 types of algorithmically generated corruptions from noise, blur, weather, and digital
categories to each OOD image. Each type of corruption has five levels of severity, resulting in 75
distinct corruptions. Thus, for each OOD image, we generate 75 corrupted images and then select
the one with the lowest OOD score (or highest confidence score to be in-distribution). Note that we
only need the outputs of the OOD detectors to construct such adversarial OOD examples; thus it is a
black-box attack.
Compositional Attack. For each OOD image, we first apply common image corruptions attack, and
then apply the L∞-norm bounded attack to generate adversarial OOD examples.
B.5 Visualizations of Four Types of OOD Samples
We show visualizations of four types of OOD samples in Figure 4.
B.6 Histogram of OOD Scores
In Figure 5, we show histogram of OOD scores for model snapshots trained on CIFAR-10 (in-
distribution) using objective (2) without informative outlier mining. We plot every ten epochs for a
model trained for a total of 100 epochs. We observe that the model quickly converges to a solution
where OOD score distribution becomes dominated by easy examples with scores closer to 1. This is
exacerbated as the model is trained for longer.
B.7 Performance of OOD Detector and Classifier on In-distribution Data
We summarize the performance of OOD detector G(x) and image classifier f(x) on in-distribution
test data. See Table 5.
B.8 Choose Best q Using Validation Dataset
We create a validation OOD dataset by sampling 10,000 images from the 80 Million Tiny Images
[49], which is disjoint from our training data. We choose q from {0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. The
results on the validation dataset are shown in Table 6. We select the best model based on the average
AUROC across four types of OOD inputs. Based on the results, the optimal q is 0.125 for CIFAR-10
and 0.25 for CIFAR-100.
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(a) Natural OOD (b) L∞ OOD
(c) Corruption OOD (d) Comp. OOD
Figure 4: Examples of four types of OOD samples.
B.9 Complete Experimental Results
We report the performance of OOD detectors on each of the six OOD test datasets in Table 7
(CIFAR-10) and Table 8 (CIFAR-100).
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Dtestin Method FNR Pred. End-to-end.Acc. Pred. Acc.
CIFAR-10
MSP 5.01 94.39 91.76
ODIN 5.01 94.39 91.02
Mahalanobis 5.01 94.39 89.71
SOFL 5.01 95.11 91.60
OE 5.01 94.79 91.86
ACET 5.01 91.70 88.64
CCU 5.01 94.89 91.88
ROWL 1.30 89.45 89.45
ATOM (ours) 5.01 94.98 91.14
CIFAR-100
MSP 5.01 75.05 73.87
ODIN 5.01 75.05 73.50
Mahalanobis 5.01 75.05 71.20
SOFL 5.01 74.37 72.62
OE 5.01 75.28 73.74
ACET 5.01 74.99 73.43
CCU 5.01 76.04 74.60
ROWL 0.40 67.53 67.53
ATOM (ours) 5.01 75.49 73.57
Table 5: The performance of OOD detector and classifier on in-distribution test data. We use three metrics:
FNR, Prediction Accuracy and End-to-end Prediction Accuracy. We pick the threshold for the OOD detectors
such that 95% of in-distribution test data points are classified as in-distribution. Prediction Accuracy measures
the accuracy of the classifier on in-distribution test data. End-to-end Prediction Accuracy measures the accuracy
of the open world classification system (detector+classifier), where an example is classified correctly if and only
if the detector treats it as in-distribution and the classifier predicts its label correctly.
Dtestin Method
FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC
(5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR)
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Natural OOD Corruption OOD L∞ OOD Comp. OOD
CIFAR-
10
ATOM (q=0.0) 5.39 98.35 39.65 92.47 35.24 91.06 60.44 80.65
ATOM (q=0.125) 5.15 98.30 30.32 93.85 5.19 98.26 31.38 93.81
ATOM (q=0.25) 6.02 98.06 33.79 92.55 22.56 95.12 43.66 91.04
ATOM (q=0.5) 9.55 97.48 39.54 91.58 18.95 95.73 51.01 89.88
ATOM (q=0.75) 13.98 96.61 56.88 87.00 14.10 96.61 57.02 87.09
CIFAR-
100
ATOM (q=0.0) 45.25 91.53 98.84 58.54 43.14 90.22 94.68 55.53
ATOM (q=0.125) 40.06 92.59 98.01 67.20 36.90 92.79 89.09 68.94
ATOM (q=0.25) 35.84 92.61 96.31 73.40 35.03 92.70 94.63 71.67
ATOM (q=0.5) 35.48 91.29 91.13 69.07 64.43 77.86 91.39 62.93
ATOM (q=0.75) 43.13 88.42 89.83 63.89 43.17 88.45 90.05 63.84
Table 6: Evaluate models on validation dataset. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓ indicates lower value is
better. All values are percentages and are averaged over six OOD test datasets mentioned in section 4.1.
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Figure 5: On CIFAR-10, we train the model with objective (2) for 100 epochs without informative outlier
mining. For every 10 epochs, we randomly sample 400,000 data points from the large unlabeled dataset and use
the current model snapshot to calculate the OOD scores.
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Dtestout Method
FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC
(5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR)
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Natural OOD Corruption OOD L∞ OOD Comp. OOD
LSUN-
C
MSP 27.34 96.30 100.00 71.64 100.00 13.76 100.00 13.68
ODIN 1.86 99.51 98.57 72.44 100.00 0.05 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 17.79 93.30 96.83 36.41 98.97 1.61 99.91 0.49
SOFL 0.39 99.40 55.61 93.09 100.00 2.52 100.00 1.96
OE 0.97 99.52 41.19 93.96 99.98 0.42 100.00 0.27
ACET 2.10 99.37 36.04 94.85 48.20 90.03 91.77 68.88
CCU 0.62 99.65 33.57 94.59 99.93 0.39 100.00 0.05
ROWL 22.65 88.02 95.46 51.62 80.54 59.08 97.40 50.65
ATOM (ours) 0.34 99.57 11.35 97.31 0.36 99.64 11.08 97.51
LSUN-
R
MSP 43.89 93.93 100.00 64.35 100.00 13.74 100.00 13.66
ODIN 3.33 99.17 98.94 64.72 100.00 0.11 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 6.68 98.04 98.77 37.01 97.98 4.87 100.00 0.06
SOFL 1.67 99.29 55.99 90.62 100.00 0.55 100.00 0.43
OE 0.99 99.43 51.61 92.22 99.98 0.14 100.00 0.04
ACET 4.35 99.03 78.49 86.79 72.93 82.95 99.87 47.92
CCU 1.53 99.28 57.05 90.50 100.00 0.03 100.00 0.10
ROWL 55.82 71.44 98.74 49.98 99.16 49.77 99.77 49.46
ATOM (ours) 0.79 99.10 26.39 95.60 37.87 94.48 50.63 92.45
iSUN
MSP 46.18 93.58 100.00 62.57 100.00 13.94 100.00 13.66
ODIN 4.64 98.96 98.85 62.93 100.00 0.29 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 8.28 97.83 98.01 40.70 94.85 9.22 100.00 0.09
SOFL 2.24 99.22 53.64 90.99 100.00 0.54 100.00 0.50
OE 1.14 99.40 47.94 92.52 99.98 0.19 100.00 0.04
ACET 7.09 98.51 75.71 86.55 80.94 78.98 99.82 46.59
CCU 1.74 99.27 52.32 91.01 100.00 0.06 100.00 0.14
ROWL 58.38 70.16 98.35 50.17 99.51 49.60 99.79 49.46
ATOM (ours) 1.10 99.17 23.06 95.96 41.97 93.35 49.77 92.08
Textures
MSP 64.66 87.64 100.00 51.85 100.00 14.20 100.00 13.72
ODIN 51.68 85.26 99.56 39.44 99.96 0.57 100.00 0.07
Mahalanobis 29.50 90.49 77.75 51.80 94.43 7.04 99.66 0.83
SOFL 3.78 99.04 57.16 89.41 99.89 2.22 99.98 1.41
OE 6.24 98.43 53.90 88.84 99.79 1.34 99.96 0.61
ACET 12.66 97.86 56.29 89.91 66.67 76.56 95.94 54.61
CCU 5.83 98.45 54.54 86.23 99.47 1.63 99.88 0.94
ROWL 24.59 87.05 82.30 58.20 85.39 56.65 92.55 53.07
ATOM (ours) 1.95 99.43 22.94 94.80 3.44 99.06 26.47 94.29
Places365
MSP 62.03 88.29 100.00 57.74 100.00 13.67 100.00 13.66
ODIN 42.67 90.63 99.90 54.15 100.00 0.01 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 86.40 65.89 99.54 20.39 99.91 0.34 100.00 0.13
SOFL 7.73 97.81 60.46 88.28 100.00 0.50 100.00 0.26
OE 11.08 97.00 68.24 87.47 100.00 0.02 100.00 0.02
ACET 17.59 96.12 79.85 84.84 92.44 67.11 99.85 45.70
CCU 8.49 97.63 66.43 85.79 99.99 0.04 100.00 0.01
ROWL 61.01 68.84 98.49 50.10 99.31 49.69 99.77 49.46
ATOM (ours) 6.95 97.82 35.37 92.95 6.95 97.88 36.11 93.03
SVHN
MSP 59.15 90.99 100.00 41.88 100.00 13.66 100.00 13.66
ODIN 26.12 94.78 100.00 20.26 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 22.36 92.08 96.57 40.23 99.91 0.32 99.99 0.31
SOFL 0.85 99.47 88.09 79.91 100.00 0.13 100.00 0.09
OE 1.55 99.16 75.77 88.96 100.00 0.01 100.00 0.01
ACET 35.00 94.80 84.86 85.07 93.96 70.31 99.89 54.24
CCU 2.14 99.25 75.10 87.94 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
ROWL 36.42 81.14 91.78 53.46 96.49 51.10 97.86 50.42
ATOM (ours) 1.27 99.59 42.61 93.18 1.26 99.60 42.43 93.35
Table 7: Comparison with competitive OOD detection methods. We use CIFAR-10 as in-distribution dataset.
We evaluate the performance on all four types of OOD inputs: (1) natural OOD, (2) corruption attacked OOD,
(3) L∞ attacked OOD, and (4) compositionally attacked OOD inputs. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓
indicates lower value is better. All values are percentages. Bold numbers are superior results.
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Dtestout Method
FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC FPR AUROC
(5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR) (5% FNR)
↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Natural OOD Corruption OOD L∞ OOD Comp. OOD
LSUN-
C
MSP 62.03 84.78 100.00 32.56 100.00 2.73 100.00 2.49
ODIN 10.54 98.13 99.99 50.42 100.00 0.76 100.00 0.03
Mahalanobis 38.69 91.18 98.55 42.44 99.08 24.72 99.95 11.86
SOFL 17.38 96.66 100.00 51.63 100.00 1.42 100.00 0.64
OE 14.75 97.33 99.98 54.39 100.00 1.67 100.00 0.69
ACET 13.69 97.55 99.78 59.52 42.55 88.00 97.34 39.64
CCU 12.03 97.84 99.66 61.38 100.00 1.01 100.00 0.52
ROWL 95.61 52.00 100.00 49.80 99.98 49.81 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 32.72 95.13 98.36 81.30 32.43 95.20 95.84 79.86
LSUN-
R
MSP 77.48 76.40 100.00 32.23 100.00 1.98 100.00 1.81
ODIN 31.96 94.04 100.00 41.10 100.00 0.55 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 16.58 95.92 99.87 27.36 93.77 36.07 100.00 9.02
SOFL 50.27 90.28 99.85 50.26 100.00 0.12 100.00 0.20
OE 56.25 84.35 99.97 41.30 100.00 0.70 100.00 0.52
ACET 51.59 86.09 99.87 37.13 99.41 13.29 99.65 9.48
CCU 38.44 91.83 99.94 50.62 100.00 0.61 100.00 0.47
ROWL 92.38 53.61 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 24.28 96.15 99.00 74.58 82.34 64.04 95.90 66.73
iSUN
MSP 78.87 75.69 100.00 31.77 100.00 2.14 100.00 1.83
ODIN 34.89 93.08 100.00 39.49 100.00 0.82 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 18.66 95.22 99.74 29.69 88.37 39.44 100.00 9.25
SOFL 53.51 89.27 99.92 48.59 100.00 0.20 100.00 0.22
OE 61.59 81.51 99.96 40.04 100.00 0.82 100.00 0.55
ACET 54.34 84.75 99.92 36.81 99.37 14.89 99.64 11.97
CCU 40.97 90.89 99.97 49.04 100.00 0.78 100.00 0.44
ROWL 94.55 52.52 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 27.05 95.66 99.25 71.68 81.39 62.63 96.97 64.48
Textures
MSP 85.57 70.08 100.00 26.02 100.00 2.74 100.00 2.30
ODIN 81.24 71.69 100.00 27.26 99.98 0.23 100.00 0.01
Mahalanobis 41.91 84.82 82.85 45.78 89.75 27.95 99.50 12.49
SOFL 57.00 87.35 99.75 43.98 99.98 0.62 100.00 0.39
OE 59.86 86.17 99.91 43.10 100.00 1.55 100.00 0.70
ACET 61.90 85.13 99.77 41.71 83.42 54.10 98.32 31.48
CCU 60.80 86.34 99.88 44.85 100.00 1.36 100.00 0.58
ROWL 97.11 51.25 100.00 49.80 99.98 49.81 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 45.25 90.68 98.74 66.76 49.11 88.26 97.30 65.24
Places365
MSP 83.65 73.71 100.00 32.23 100.00 1.87 100.00 1.94
ODIN 80.25 76.20 100.00 36.22 100.00 0.01 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 94.52 59.41 99.82 16.47 99.94 11.19 100.00 8.02
SOFL 60.49 87.57 99.99 40.21 100.00 0.09 100.00 0.16
OE 58.37 86.39 99.97 50.91 100.00 0.56 100.00 0.54
ACET 56.81 86.75 99.82 48.27 92.20 51.07 98.41 27.41
CCU 55.23 87.21 99.98 44.11 100.00 0.47 100.00 0.42
ROWL 96.52 51.54 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 52.63 88.67 99.24 69.22 49.92 89.02 97.95 66.64
SVHN
MSP 80.71 76.00 100.00 25.65 100.00 2.62 100.00 2.39
ODIN 79.27 73.55 100.00 23.68 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
Mahalanobis 49.15 87.33 98.91 39.10 99.84 20.90 100.00 11.25
SOFL 21.50 96.15 100.00 36.52 100.00 0.09 100.00 0.19
OE 44.47 92.58 100.00 40.87 100.00 0.54 100.00 0.55
ACET 47.80 90.55 100.00 36.84 59.05 82.17 98.25 29.76
CCU 50.79 91.59 100.00 39.94 100.00 0.45 100.00 0.41
ROWL 99.05 50.28 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80 100.00 49.80
ATOM (ours) 22.42 96.43 99.91 70.09 22.15 96.50 97.01 70.64
Table 8: Comparison with competitive OOD detection methods. We use CIFAR-100 as in-distribution dataset.
We evaluate the performance on all four types of OOD inputs: (1) natural OOD, (2) corruption attacked OOD,
(3) L∞ attacked OOD, and (4) compositionally attacked OOD inputs. ↑ indicates larger value is better, and ↓
indicates lower value is better. All values are percentages. Bold numbers are superior results.
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